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Abstract 
Middle-income trap has become a very popular narrative to explain the fact, that while it is 
relatively “easy” to catch up from low to middle-income level, it has been very hard and rare 
to emerge from the middle-income status into a highly developed economy. The question is, 
how to escape this trap? why some countries have been successful although the great majority 
has failed? 
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Introduction 
The spectacular development of some emerging economies in East-Asia, including that of 
China, drew the general attention to the possibilities and difficulties to overcome 
underdevelopment. Two new narratives emerged in recent years for the explanation of 
successes and failures: the middle-income trap as a possible explication of difficulties and the 
developmental state as a variety of capitalism that may lead to success. In this paper we try to 
introduce the different concepts about the nature and characteristics of the middle-income trap 
and to elaborate how the developmental state can serve to escape the middle-income trap. 
Middle Income Trap: Most recent Narrative on the Key Question of Development 
The very term middle-income trap (MIT) is supposed to be used first by Gill - Kharas et al. 
(2007) in a World Bank study on East Asia and since then, Middle-income trap has become a 
very widespread category in the most recent narrative on development.2 According to them, “of 
101 middle-income economies in 1960, only 13 became high income ones by 2008 – Equatorial 
Guinea, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, China, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Mauritius, Portugal, Puerto 
Rico, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain and Taiwan, China.” (World Bank, 2012: 12) 
This narrative of MIT became very popular as a theoretical drafting of the special 
growth/development problem of developing countries, as well as a useful groundwork for 
policymakers to outline their economic strategy and preoccupations in middle-income 
countries. This term became popular particularly in the fallout of the global ﬁnancial crisis. 
Ever since, the nature and risks of the middle-income trap have been widely discussed by 
economists, business leaders and leading politicians. 
                                                 
1 The paper was prepared in the framework of the research project „From developmental states to new 
protectionism: changing repertoire of state interventions to promote development in an unfolding new world 
order” (NKFI FK_124573)” – lead by Judit Ricz, senior research fellow, Institute for World Economics. 
2 “In May 2015, a search of Google Scholar returned more than 3,000 articles including the term and about 300 
articles with the term in the title.” (Ghill – Kharas, 2015. ii.) 
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Middle-income trap is a frequently used term in development studies/economics in order to 
describe the phenomenon that a lot of developing countries that have made significant progress 
in reducing extreme poverty and experience structural change and growth, but later, after having 
become middle-income economy, they face insurmountable obstacles to graduate into a high-
income, developed country status. 
Among the most important reasons of the middle-income trap we can list the following:  
• wages/unit labour costs in manufacturing are rising and the surplus supply of labour 
dwindles since the reserves of rural-urban migration had exhausted; 
• productivity growth slow down and neither skilled labour nor technology are available 
to accelerate again; 
• there are no more possibilities to develop manufacturing and increase productivity 
through copying/importing technologies. 
In the background of the above mentioned factors, some important institutional weaknesses 
may be found such as the lack of the necessary support of an adoptive and creative economy: 
social capital does not promote sustainable growth and does not create a healthy environment 
for technological development. Therefore, the middle-income trap may prevent the emergence 
of a knowledge economy that is the first and foremost precondition for becoming high-
income/developed economy in the current world economic situation. 
 “Middle-income countries, it is argued, are squeezed between the low-wage poor-country 
competitors that dominate in mature industries and the rich-country innovators that dominate 
in industries undergoing rapid technological change. This is the challenge that confronts East 
Asian countries today, especially those in Southeast Asia. There is reason for optimism. The 
newly industrializing economies in East Asia successfully made this transition from middle 
income to rich, showing that such a transition is possible under the proper circumstances and 
the correct policies. And, within Asia, experience suggests that there is not such a sharp 
distinction between the domination of low-income countries in manufacturing and the 
domination of rich countries in the knowledge economy.”  (Ibid. 5.) 
In the 1980s and 1990s an augmented Solow growth model was emphasized by mainstream 
growth theories and by international financial organisations (such as the IMF and the World 
Bank) as well. According to this theory efficient physical and human capital accumulation were 
the necessary drivers of dynamic growth. “At the World Bank, this was operationalized by 
prescribing a focus on export-led manufacturing to take advantage of comparatively cheap 
labour, coupled with health and education programs to improve skills. The outward orientation 
would ensure investment was allocated based on internationally-set market prices, and 
improved skills would create growth with equity.” (Gill – Kharas, 2015: 1.) In the first years 
of the 21st century it became clear that this theory might have fit well with the situation of the 
low-income countries but it did not provided any guidance for the middle-income countries: 
labour intensive growth models didn’t offered any feasible strategy to catch-up with high 
income countries, especially because the developed countries, in the meantime, had entered into 
the age of knowledge-based economies. 
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In Acemoglu’s and Robinson’s seminal work (Acemoglu – Robinson, 2012) the key factors 
behind development are inclusive economic institutions3 and countries with extractive 
economic institutions are necessary failing behind.4 In this perception, however, there is a 
limited opportunity for macroeconomic development, relatively dynamic growth. The first 
example is that of the Soviet Union between 1928 and the mid-seventies: „Political and 
economic institutions were highly extractive, and markets were heavily constrained. 
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was able to achieve rapid economic growth because it could use 
the power of the state to move resources from agriculture, where they were very inefficiently 
used, into industry. The second type of growth under extractive political institutions arises when 
the institutions permit the development of somewhat, even if not completely, inclusive 
economic institutions. Many societies with extractive political institutions will shy away from 
inclusive economic institutions because of fear of creative destruction. But the degree to which 
the elite manage to monopolize power varies across societies. In some, the position of the elite 
could be sufficiently secure that they may permit some moves toward inclusive economic 
institutions when they are fairly certain that this will not threaten their political power. 
Alternatively, the historical situation could be such as to endow an extractive political regime 
with rather inclusive economic institutions, which they decide not to block. These provide the 
second way in which growth can take place under extractive political institutions.” (Acemoglu 
– Robinson, 2012: 92) 
Eichengreen and his co-authors provide a very simple, and extremely interesting and instructive 
definition: first they emphasise that “The rapid economic growth of so-called emerging markets 
is one of the leading storylines of our age and arguably the most important economic 
development affecting the world’s population in the first decade of the 21st century.  It has 
lifted millions of households out of poverty.  It has accounted for the vast majority of global 
growth in a period when the advanced countries have been economically challenged and 
financially troubled.” (Eichengreen et al., 2013: 3) An later on, answering a very simple 
question, we arrive to the definition of the middle-income trap: “For some time now the 
question on everyone’s mind has been how long this rapid growth can continue, in emerging 
markets in general and the group’s largest and most economically dynamic member, China, in 
particular.  Attempts to answer that question have given rise to a literature on what is referred 
to, alternatively, as “growth slowdowns” and “the middle-income trap.” (Ibid.) 
Middle-income trap: some empirical evidences 
“Middle-income countries5, accounted for less than a fifth of the global economy (17 percent) 
even at the beginning of the 20th century. However, by 2017, their share had doubled to 35 
percent. The share for lower middle income countries doubled from 4 percent in 2002 to 8 
percent in 2017 while the share for upper middle income countries increased from 13 to 27 
                                                 
3 “Inclusive economic institutions, such as those in South Korea or in the United States, are those that allow and 
encourage participation by the great mass of people in economic activities that make best use of their talents and 
skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish. To be inclusive, economic institutions must feature 
secure private property, an unbiased system of law, and a provision of public services that provides a level playing 
field in which people can exchange and contract; it also must permit the entry of new businesses and allow people 
to choose their careers.” (Acemoglu – Robinson, 2012: 74) 
4 “We call such institutions, which have opposite properties to those we call inclusive, extractive economic 
institutions—extractive because such institutions are designed to extract incomes and wealth from one subset of 
society to benefit a different subset.” (Op. cit. 76) 
5 For fiscal year 2019, income groups according to the WB are as follows:  low-income economies are defined as 
those with a GNI per capita of 995 USD or less in 2017; lower middle-income economies are those with a GNI 
per capita between $996 and 3,895 USD; upper middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between 
USD 3,896 and 12,055 and high-income economies are those having a higher per capita GNI than 2,056 USD. 
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percent. High-income countries, currently home to fewer than one in five of the world’s people, 
saw their share of global GDP fall from 83 percent to 64 percent. Economic growth in high-
income countries remains below that of the rest of the world, so this share is likely to fall further. 
Low-income countries, which account for just nine percent of the world’s population, produce 
just over half a percent of global GDP.” (World Bank, 2019)  
According to the above classification by the World Bank, in fiscal year 2017 there were 47 
lower middle-income countries and 56 upper middle-income one while 34 countries were 
classified as low-income countries and not less than 81 as high-income ones. Empirical works 
suggest that the growth rate generally slows substantially at per capita GDP of 10 to 15 thousand 
USD. Growth slowdowns can often be attributed to the disappearance of factors that generate 
high growth during an initial phase of rapid development. The first stage of growth from low 
to middle income is   based upon cheap labour force that had streamed from agriculture to 
industry (and, therefore, from the villages to the cities) and high rates of investment. According 
to a comprehensive World Bank study, there were 101 middle-income countries in the world 
economy as of 1960, and “only 13 had become high income by 2008: Equatorial Guinea; 
Greece; Hong Kong; China; Ireland; Israel; Japan; Mauritius; Portugal; Puerto Rico; South 
Korea; Singapore; Spain; and Taiwan, China. By contrast, although many countries in Latin 
America and the Middle East reached middle-income status as early as the 1960s and 1970s, a 
great majority of them have remained there ever since. In Latin America, for instance, income 
per capita relative to the United States fell almost continuously from 1960 to 2005, especially 
after the debt crises of the early 1980s. Likewise, economic growth in many Middle Eastern 
and North African countries has waned and given way to high unemployment…” (Agénor – 
Canuto - Jelenic, 2012) 
According to an empirically well based opinion “slowdowns are still most likely when per 
capita GDP in year-2005 constant dollars reaches the $15,000 range, the distribution of 
slowdowns is no longer as obviously uni-model.  In fact, the new data point to the existence of 
two modes, one around $15,000 and another around $11,000.” (Eichengreen – Park and Shin, 
2013) Others define four income groups in the world economy: low-income below USD 2 000; 
lower-middle-income between USD 2 000 and 7 250; upper-middle-income between USD 7250 
and 11 750 and high income beyond USD 11 750 (in 1990 PPP dollar terms). a country that 
becomes upper-middle-income (reaching USD 7 250 per capita income) has to attain an average 
growth rate of at least 3.5 percent per annum to reach USD 11 750, the high-income level 
threshold. “Avoiding the middle-income trap is, therefore, a question of how to grow fast 
enough so as to cross the lower-middle-income segment in at most 28 years, and the upper-
middle-income segment in at most 14 years.” (Felipe – Abdon – Kumar, 2012)  
According to a most recent analysis by the World Bank, “The world’s Middle Income Countries 
(MICs) are a diverse group by size, population, and income level. They are defined as lower 
middle-income economies - those with a GNI per capita between $1,006 and $3,955;  and upper 
middle-income economies -  those with a GNI per capita between $3,956 and $12,235 (2018). 
Middle income countries are home to five of the world’s seven billion people and 73 percent of 
the world’s poor people.  At the same time, middle income countries represent about one third 
of global GDP and are major engines of global growth.” (World Bank, 2018)  
For the current 2019 fiscal year, low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per 
capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of $995 or less in 2017; lower middle-
income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $996 and $3,95; upper middle-
income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $3,96 and $12,375; high-income 
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economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12,376 or more.6 According to this listing, there 
are 10 low-oncome economies and 47 lower-middle income economies in the world economy.7 
The WB lists 60 of its members in the group of upper-middle income economies and records 
80 high-income economies. This classification/listing does not provide a solid starting point to 
estimate the number of countries potentially affected by the medium income trap.  
According to the classification provided by Felipe – Abdon – Kumar, 2012,based on income 
data from 2010,8  37 countries were always among the low-income countries, while 9 countries9 
emerged from lower-middle income status to the higher-middle income group and 23 countries 
graduated from the middle-income to high income status: 14 out of them are (West-)European 
and there are 5 East-Asian countries as well. It is very interesting to realise that the Republic of 
Korea and Taipei-China graduated in the covered sixty years from a low-middle income country 
to a high-income country.10 Because of historical reasons, we may consider four out of the five 
East-Asian countries (that is the Republic of Korea, Taipei-China, Hong Kong and Singapore) 
as those who avoided the middle-income trap. 
The creators of the very concept of middle-income trap have summarized and affirmed the 
research experiences of ten years as follows: 
• middle-income trap was not the expression of a generalised development theory, just 
the contrary: it was the expression of the lack of an adequate category (and growth 
theory) for middle-income (developing) countries. In fact, it was a “trap of ignorance”: 
the expression of inadequacy of the Solow growth model for addressing the 
development problems of the middle income (developing) countries  
• the very term trap expressed the fact that past success/growth performance did not 
provide guarantee of future success, that is keeping extended growth dynamism for the 
future as well. 
• “Third, the trap was a device to spark a discussion of policy choices in middle-income 
countries.  It was not intended to be a statement of determinism that low growth rates 
were a matter of destiny for middle-income countries. (…) It was not a statement that 
middle-income countries are more likely to be trapped than other countries. In fact, we 
were silent on low-income countries and high-income countries because the focus of 
our attention was on policy making in middle-income countries. In retrospect, it would 
have been helpful to clarify this.” (Gill – Kharas, 2015: 4.) 
How to escape the middle-income trap? 
“To avoid middle-income trap” has become the adequate expression of being a successful 
developing country and being able to catch up with developed economies. “The “middle-
income trap” is the phenomenon of hitherto rapidly growing economies stagnating at middle-
income levels and failing to graduate into the ranks of high-income countries. (…) several East 
Asian economies have in recent decades provided a template for »success«: continuing to grow 
rapidly after attaining middle-income status, and thereby attaining per capita income levels 
                                                 
6 See: World Bank (2019): World Bank Country and Lending Groups – Country Classification. Source: 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups. 
Downloaded: 18/07/2019 
7 The World Bank has 189 member countries. 
8 The sample covered 124 countries having continuous data sets from 1950 to 2010. 
9 China, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Taipei–China, Thailand, Bulgaria, Turkey, Costa Rica and Oman. 
10 Singapore and Hong Kong, China have certainly realised the same spectacular development (that is, they also 
graduated two levels in the given period), but Malaysia did not exist in 1950 and Hong Kong was not considered 
as an independent entity. 
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comparable to advanced countries.” (Aiyar, Duval, Puy, Wu, and Zhang, 2013) Developing 
countries, after having achieved a middle-income level, find themselves in an extremely 
difficult situation: there are “squeezed between low-wage producers and highly skilled and fast-
moving innovators. Cost advantages in manufactured exports that once drove growth start to 
decline in comparison with other lower-wage countries. Caught between these two groups, 
many middle-income countries are without a viable high-growth strategy. They are faced with 
new challenges, including social cohesion, a large pool of young people in search of jobs, as 
well as millions who still live in misery and poverty, particularly in lagging regions.” (Ghani, 
2013)  
The above idea corresponds to traditional growth theories: countries in the middle-income 
status tend to face an important productivity slowdown because of the loss of previous 
competitive advantages in basic manufacturing that had been based on low wages. “In other 
words, cost advantages in manufactured exports that once propelled growth start to decline 
compared to other lower-wage economies. Dividends in terms of economic growth originating 
from a sectoral shift from agriculture to manufacturing (…) and gains from technology 
adjustment and adoption start to wane. Wages increase and consequently, competitiveness is 
undermined against a backdrop of a slow rise in productivity.” (Rachman – Bari, 2016:4) All 
of this is in line with Lewis development model. Since most of the middle-income developing 
economies had realised the previous rapid growth performance basically on low-wage and low-
skilled labour force, therefore, this development was based on the extended production of low 
value added manufacturing. When labour reserves are exhausted, the loose of momentum is 
inevitable since wage increases reduce productivity and competitiveness.  Middle-income 
countries have been caught up in between low-wage poor-country competitors that successful 
and competitive in old fashioned manufacturing industries and the rich-country that are 
innovators and, therefore dominate those industries in which rapid technological changes are 
undergoing.  
Although quite many countries are unfortunately captured in a low-income trap (especially in 
Sub-Saharan Africa), it is relatively easy to reach the middle income level while countries can 
rely on cheap labour force allocated from agriculture towards manufacturing and run an export 
led macroeconomic strategy. In the Solow growth model, efficient physical and human capital 
accumulation are the main sources of dynamic growth, and in quite many developing countries 
“this was operationalized by prescribing a focus on export-led manufacturing to take advantage 
of comparatively cheap labour, coupled with health and education programs to improve skills. 
The outward orientation would ensure investment was allocated based on internationally-set 
market prices, and improved skills would create growth with equity.” (Gill – Kharas, 2015: 1)  
In the first period of development, when the country emerges from low-income to medium-
income one, the main technological requirement is to copy and adapt internationally available 
basic technologies. A low level of skills promotes labour intensive growth of manufacturing. 
At a more developed stage, that is in order to graduate from middle-income level into high-
income country. genuine innovation requires advanced skills, in a wider spectrum of industries. 
This development from low-technology to advanced industrial activities could become the main 
driving force for productivity change in the economy. At the end of the day, this technological 
changes lead to the knowledge-based economy and transform the given country into a 
developed, high-income one. 
The above technological development, and the knowledge based economy in itself, requires an 
important development of education and training. The development of Taiwanese vocational 
education system has followed and served the overall economic development, having 
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pragmatically reformed itself according to the changing structural needs of economic 
development. Even in the 1960s, 56 percent of the labour force was employed in agriculture 
and only 17 percent in industry, therefore, in the early period vocational training focused mainly 
on agriculture.11 In order to provide the necessary amount of manpower for agriculture and 
basic manufacturing, the then Taiwanese government started to create an extensive vocational 
training system consisting mainly of agricultural and industrial vocational schools. After the 
evolution of manufacturing based export-led development, in the second half of the 1960s and 
in the 1970s, the Ministry of Education began dynamically developing vocational education in 
technics. After educating the necessary amount of basic and higher level technicians, since the 
late 1970s there was a constantly growing demand for commercial training, therefore, the 
number of commercial vocational schools expanded quickly and an important part of industrial 
vocational schools was transformed into medium-level schools of business and technology. In 
the 1980s, vocational educational system started to adapt to the growing demand of the service 
sector. In the 1990s, the emergence of informatics challenged very much the Taiwanese 
educational system: both in higher education and in vocational training an immediate reaction 
became indispensable.  
Since the very early 1990s, the structure of Taiwanese manufacturing shifted towards 
information and communication technologies (ICT) and the main economic policy goal was to 
provide interim goods for global ICT giants. This economic policy modification transformed 
the demand of labour force. Since students become more motivated to study in higher education, 
the government allowed technical colleges to transform themselves into institutes of technology 
as well as universities were allowed to establish two-year technology programs. In the same 
time, Taiwanese government began to encourage the establishment of community colleges.  
Well performing vocational training can be based on solid a basic education system. A widely 
accepted international measurement/comparison is Pisa ranking by the OECD that quantifies 
and compare the skills and abilities of fifteen years old population in terms of mathematics, 
sciences and reading. As Table 1. shows well Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan do perform 
fairly well, that is well over the OECD average. A maybe even more important result of the 
Pisa ranking is that in these three countries the share of top performers is well over the OECD 
average while the share of low performers is much lower than the average. 
In parallel, South-east Asian emerging economies which avoided the middle-income trap 
(Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) had focused increasingly, and more and more 
successfully on higher education as well. It has been reflected in global university rankings let’s 
take a look only at the most recent issue of The Times’ World University Ranking.12 Singapore 
has two universities in the global top 50.13 Taiwan has one university among the first 200, two 
Taiwanese universities are ranked between the 401-500 best ones, while five universities are 
ranked between 501 – 660 and three between 601 – 800, and further ten universities are ranked 
among the first 1000. South Korea is the most successful in the region: South Korean 
universities are ranked on 63rd, 82nd, 102nd, 142nd and 198th places in the global university 
ranking. Furthermore, the country has two universities between 201 – 250, and on ranked 
                                                 
11 See an informative paper of the International Cooperation and Development Fund (ISDF): 
http://www.icdf.org.tw/web_pub/20020726112915centamspecial.pdf 
12 https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2019/world-ranking#!/ 
page/0/length/25/locations/SG/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats Downloaded: 18/08/2019 
13 National University of Singapore is ranked 23rd and Nanyang Technological University, Singapore is ranked 
51st. 
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between 351 – 400 and 401 – 500, three South Korean universities are ranked between 501 – 
600 and five ones between 601 – 800 and 801 – 1000.14 
Table 1. PISA rankings of Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, 2009, 2012 and 2015 
 OECD 
average 
Singapore 
South 
Korea 
Taiwan 
2015 
Science 493 556 516 532 
Reading 493 535 517 497 
Mathematics 490 564 524 542 
Top performers 15,3% 39,1% 25,6% 29,9% 
Low 
performers 
13,0% 4,8% 7,7% 8,3% 
2012 
Science 501 551 538 523 
Reading 496 542 536 523 
Mathematics 494 573 554 560 
Top performers 
maths 
12,6% 40,0% 30,9% 37,2% 
Low perfor-
mers maths 
25,1% 8,3% 9,1% 12,8% 
2009 
Science 501 542 538 520 
Reading 493 526 539 495 
Mathematics 496 562 546 543 
Source: OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pisa/ Downloaded: 18/08/2019 
Another recent international university ranking provides quite similar results. According to the 
Academic Ranking of World Universities (“Shanghai Ranking” in other words)15 two 
universities from Singapore are ranked in the first 100 universities16, one Taiwanese university 
is ranked between 101 - 200, two between 201 - 500 and nine between 501 – 1000. Two South 
Korean universities are ranked between 101 – 200, nine is ranked between 201 – 500 while 21 
(!) further universities from South Korea are ranked between 501 – 1000.17 
These excellent performances in education and training provide a solid basis (among other 
elements) for an equally excellent performance in innovation.  
In Agénor’s and Canuto’s analysis, “there is a two-way causality between education and 
innovation. Countries may remain caught in a low or moderate growth equilibrium because 
they are unable to get enough high potential workers into innovation activities; and because 
wages are low as a result, a fewer number of individuals with high potential are willing to make 
the investment needed to acquire the skills needed to seek employment in the innovation sector. 
The composition of the labour force depends therefore on the interaction between supply and 
demand factors, and a middle-income growth trap can also be characterized by a misallocation 
of talent.” (Agénor – Canuto, 2012: 25) They argue that advanced infrastructure, especially in 
                                                 
14 Memorandum items: Hungary has one university between 401 500, two between 601-800 and another two 
between 801 – 1000. Poland has two universities ranked between 301 – 800 and further three between 801 – 1000. 
15 The most recent ranking has been published in late August of 2019. See: 
http://www.shanghairanking.com/ARWU2019.html Downloaded: 21/08/2019 
16 National University of Singapore is ranked 67th and Nanyang Technological University is ranked 73rd.  
17 As memorandum items, on may remark that Hungary has five universities between 501 – 1000, while China has 
4 universities in the first 100, fourteen between 101 – 200, 39 between 201 – 500 and not less than 74 (!) between 
501 – 1000. 
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the design sector, also plays a critical role in preventing the country from getting stuck in low 
income: the provision of advanced research infrastructure may be more effective than direct 
subsidies. Agénor and Canuto argue that “the lack of advanced infrastructure, which is 
particularly productive in the design sector (in part because it promotes knowledge networks), 
plays a critical role in helping a country escape from a lower-growth trap, not only because of 
its direct eﬀect on productivity but also because of its eﬀect on the supply of high-skilled labour. 
In turn, a growing skill base facilitates a shift in production from labour-intensive to skill-
intensive activities and an increase in the pace of innovation. Somewhat paradoxically, a 
reallocation of (limited) government resources from direct subsidies to research and innovation 
activities toward the provision of advanced infrastructure may actually be more eﬀective at 
promoting these activities and magnifying their impact on economic growth.” (Ibid.) Agénor’s 
and Canuto’s third finding is that “in addition to advanced infrastructure, improving the 
enforcement of property rights (in particular the administration of patents), and removing (some 
types of) labour market rigidities may help to accelerate the pace of innovation and be quite 
eﬀective at helping a country avoid a middle-income growth trap.” (Ibid.) 
Rankings in Global Competitiveness Report ‘201818 provides a fairly deepened description of 
the role and importance of innovation in the given countries relative/global competitiveness 
positions. 
Singapore was the second most competitive economy in 2018, achieving 90 percent of the best 
performer in infrastructure and macroeconomic stability and 75% of the best in terms of 
innovation ecosystem. The 11th and 12th pillar of competitiveness in the GCR ranking are 
business sophistication and innovation, respectively, which are the key factors for innovation-
driven economy.  In terms of the 11th pillar, Singapore is ranked 16th, but have better position 
in time to start a business (5th), insolvency recovery rate (4th) and the cost of starting business 
(11th). In terms of the 12th pillar, Singapore is ranked 14th, inside this pillar the country is 
ranked 2nd diversity of workforce, 7th in institutions and inventions, 11th in buyer satisfaction 
and 14th in patent application. 
Taiwan is the 13th most competitive economy of the World, first in macrostability19 and has a 
90 percent performance in the development of human capital. The country is ranked 21st in 
terms of business dynamism (11th pillar) and 4th in innovation capability (12nd pillar). The 
country is especially well placed in patent application (2nd), in the state of cluster development, 
international co-invention and R&D expenditures (compared to the GDP, in percentage) 
Taiwan is ranked 5th, it is 6th in diversity of workforce and 10th in buyer sophistication. 
South-Korea is the 15th most competitive economy in the World – the first in macroeconomic 
stability and ICT adoption, it has a 96% position in the development of human capital and 
performed 6th in the development of infrastructure. As far as the 11th pillar is concerned, South 
Korea is ranked 22nd and has a particularly preferred position in insolvency regulatory 
framework (8th), as well as in terms of insolvency recovery rate and the time to start business 
(12nd in each).20 South Korea’s innovation capability (12nd pillar) is the 8th best among the 
ranked countries and in this pillar the country achieved especially good rankings in R&D 
                                                 
18 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2018/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport 2018.pdf 
19 That is, Taiwan has 100 percent and every other country is compared to Taiwan’s performance. 
20 Its performance in this pillar is extremely deteriorated by its poor performance in the cost of *starting business 
(93rd) and the willingness to delegate authority (88th). 
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expenditures (compared to the GDP) and buyer sophistication (2nd) and in terms of patent 
application (3rd ranking). 
High performances in education and training, as well as in terms of innovation obviously have 
a key importance in escaping/avoiding the middle-income trap. 
While talking on the middle-income trap, it is inevitable to mention China. “The rapid economic 
growth of so-called emerging markets is one of the leading storylines of our age and arguably 
the most important economic development affecting the world’s population in the first decade 
of the 21st century.  It has lifted millions of households out of poverty.  It has accounted for the 
vast majority of global growth in a period when the advanced countries have been economically 
challenged and financially troubled. For some time now the question on everyone’s mind has 
been how long this rapid growth can continue, in emerging markets in general and the group’s 
largest and most economically dynamic member, China, in particular.” (Eichengreen et al., 
2013: 3.) 
Many Chinese experts assess that the theory of middle-income trap is relevant to the current 
macroeconomic situation of China and thank the China is likely to avoid this trap. (See for 
example: Cai, 2012, Woo, 2012 and Zhang et al. 2012) Ágnes Szunomár, an acclaimed 
Hungarian China watcher, after having analysed the structural changes, demographic 
tendencies and the role of education and innovation, concluded that China may avoid the 
middle-income trap and is likely to become a highly developed economy in the coming 7-8 
years. (Szunomár, 2019: 104) Other reviews are more cautious: according to Glawe and 
Wagner, 2017, China might improve human capital accumulation and total factor productivity 
in order to escape the middle-income trap. Woo, 2012 does emphasise that China, because of 
its several different development traps, requires new governance principles and methods in 
order to avoid the middle-income trap. Anyway, the future development in China will be 
decisive for the fate of the world economy, and will provide new theoretical conclusions about 
the middle-income trap. 
Several researchers are sceptical about the question itself: is there a middle-income trap? 
(Bulman et al., 2017) Others refer to the fact that similar cases had occurred in the global 
economic history much earlier, and the topic has not been discussed with the necessary 
theoretical depth and sophistication, therefore, the term is “unduly overused”. (Benczes, 2019) 
Other are challenging the universal relevance of the term middle-income trap: the experiences 
of Japan and South-Korea are nor generally relevant because their development path is so 
deeply rooted in Asian culture that it cannot be transferred to other cultures. It is useless to 
discuss the development of, for example, China, Brazil, Russia, Romani and Lebanon, in the 
same theoretical framework. (Muraközy, 2019)  
“The middle-income trap is a narrative of growth stagnation that reﬂects (and exacerbates) 
current and long-standing anxieties about slow economic growth. This anxiety is perhaps only 
growing more acute amid the prevailing notion of a global growth slowdown. This includes 
even China, the growth star in recent decades.  Historical experience and empirical evidence 
show that the transition from middle-income to high-income levels takes time, and requires 
countries to pursue consistently sound but evolving policies to maintain the fundamental drivers 
of economic growth. Diﬀerent stages of growth call for diﬀerent strategies and policies, and the 
right reforms often take time to impact economic growth.  Ultimately, each country’s growth 
story is unique but the general prescription remains the same. Policymakers should critically 
examine their growth strategies to ﬁnd the most eﬀective ways to boost productivity 
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improvement, which is the key to supporting, nourishing, and preserving long-run economic 
growth.” (Larson – Loayza – Woolcock, 2016: 4)  
Even if the middle-income trap is a myth or a well-sounding title of a long-known and banal 
phenomenon, “it provides impetus for policymakers to reassess their strategies based on 
productivity improvement once the traditional sources of economic growth have lost their 
strength.” (Op. cit. 1. – italics mine: Gy. Cs.) 
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